A model to estimate the operating  &  maintenance (O & M) costs of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by Chia, Tommy.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-12
A model to estimate the operating  &  maintenance
(O & M) costs of the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles
Chia, Tommy.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
A MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE OPERATING & 
MAINTENANCE (O&M) COSTS OF THE MINE RESISTANT 








 Thesis Advisor: Daniel A. Nussbaum 
 Second Reader: Keebom Kang 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
A Model to Estimate the Operating and Maintenance (O&M) Costs of the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Tommy Chia 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Requirement and Acquisition Office (Policy Division) of the United Special 
Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621. 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ______N/A________.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This research was initiated by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to understand the potential operating and 
maintenance (O&M) cost involved in the running of their Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which is presently 
funded under the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. The purpose of this thesis was to develop a model to 
estimate the future O&M cost when funding from the OCO budget request ceases and is shifted to their service’s budget.  
This study analyzed the annual O&M costs of the MRAP vehicles, using available fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 2009 data 
from the MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO) and regression analysis. The regression models were subjected to tests of statistically 
significance and due to the shortage of data, were found to be insignificant. The O&M cost per vehicle for SOCOM was observed 
to be much higher than that of other services for most of the cost elements. There were, however, insufficient data to verify the 
factors that bring about the high cost. The importance of the observations lies in the following: 
Problem Recommendation 
The paucity of the underlying dataset (FY 2008 and 
2009 data) is the cause of the lack of statistical 
significance. 
Continue to collect current annual O&M data for the 
MRAP vehicles by service, particularly SOCOM. 
Army data representing 75% of MRAP inventory 
dominates the analyses. 
Disaggregate data (when available) by service and 
develop service-unique models. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
105 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
SOCOM, O&M, MRAP, OCO, Regression, Test of Statistical Significance  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
A MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE OPERATING & MAINTENANCE (O&M) 





Civilian, ST Engineering, Singapore 
B.Eng (Hons), University of New South Wales, Australia, 2002 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Robert F. Dell 
Chairman, Department of Operations Research 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This research was initiated by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to 
understand the potential operating and maintenance (O&M) cost involved in the running 
of their Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which is presently funded 
under the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. The purpose of this 
thesis was to develop a model to estimate the future O&M cost when funding from the 
OCO budget request ceases and is shifted to their service’s budget.  
This study analyzed the annual O&M costs of the MRAP vehicles, using available 
fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 2009 data from the MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO) and 
regression analysis. The regression models were subjected to tests of statistically 
significance and due to the shortage of data, were found to be insignificant. The O&M 
cost per vehicle for SOCOM was observed to be much higher than that of other services 
for most of the cost elements. There were, however, insufficient data to verify the factors 
that brought about the high cost. The importance of the observations lies in the following: 
Problem Recommendation 
The paucity of the underlying dataset (FY 
2008 and 2009 data) is the cause of the lack 
of statistical significance. 
Continue to collect current annual O&M 
data for the MRAP vehicles by service, 
particularly SOCOM. 
Army data representing 75% of MRAP 
inventory dominates the analyses. 
Disaggregate data (when available) by 
service and develop service-unique models. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The role of High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the 
United State military started in the late 1980s and their primary role was to transport 
personnel and cargo behind the front line. These vehicles were able to satisfy the needs of 
the U.S. military in conventional warfare, measured by acceptable personnel losses. The 
start of the War on Terrorism in 2001 brought about a rise in asymmetric warfare and 
low-intensity conflict, together with the employment of small arms fire, machine guns, 
rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the opposed side 
and along with it, the clear inability of the HMMWV’s design to protect against these 
attacks. 
As a result, in late 2007 the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) launched a major 
procurement initiative with the intent to replace most of the HMMWVs with Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by the year 2009. These MRAP vehicles 
are known to have significantly higher personnel survivability in an IED or land mine 
encounter. This is due to the unique V-shaped hull design not seen in most armored 
personnel carriers (APCs) including the HMMWVs. In order to meet the large order and 
short fielding plan, many manufacturers were contracted with many variants of the 
MRAP vehicles produced. This implicitly translates to high downstream maintenance 
cost and logistics challenges. 
This research was initiated due to a request from the Requirement and Acquisition 
Office (Policy Division) of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to 
understand the potential cost involved in the operating and maintenance (O&M) of their 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which is presently funded under the 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. This thesis develops a model to 
estimate the future O&M cost when funding from the OCO budget request ceases and is 




The initial approach was to use the historical data residing in the Army’s 
Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) and the Marine 
Corps’ Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
management information system as an analogy and then translate the result across to 
SOCOM. This direction proved to be infeasible because the relationship between the 
variables of the collected data (to-date) could not be correlated with reasonable statistical 
significance. As a last resort, the data source from the MRAP Joint Program Office 
(JPO), in the form of a cost element structure (CES), was used for the analyses.  
This study analyzed the annual O&M costs of the MRAP vehicles, using available 
fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 2009 data from the MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO) and 
regression analysis. The regression models were subjected to tests of statistically 
significance and due to the shortage of data, were found to be insignificant. The O&M 
cost per vehicle for SOCOM was observed to be much higher than that of other services 
for most of the cost elements. There were, however, insufficient data to verify the factors 
that brought about the high cost. The importance of the observations lies in the following: 
Problem Recommendation 
The paucity of the underlying dataset (FY 
2008 and 2009 data) is the cause of the lack 
of statistical significance. 
Continue to collect current annual O&M 
data for the MRAP vehicles by service, 
particularly SOCOM. 
Army data representing 75% of MRAP 
inventory dominates the analyses. 
Disaggregate data (when available) by 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OBJECTIVE 
This thesis investigates the cost involved in the operating & maintenance (O&M) 
of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in theater, in particular those 
under the inventory of the United States Special Operation Command (U.S. SOCOM), 
and thereafter, establishes a parametric relationship between this cost and the number of 
vehicles in the field. This relationship will assist the planners at the Requirement and 
Acquisition Office (Policy Division) of SOCOM to estimate the future sustainment 
requirements for these vehicles.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions were generated to guide and scope the thesis. 
1. Primary Research Question 
• What parametric/statistical cost-estimating models (e.g., linear or non-
linear regression) can explain and be used to predict the future 
maintenance cost of the MRAP vehicles under the inventory of SOCOM? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• How much does SOCOM spend annually on the running of the MRAP 
vehicles that are in their inventory? 
• How does SOCOM’s spending compare to that of the other services (e.g., 
Marine Corps) or other vehicles (similar function or class) within the 
service? 
• How does this spending vary with the operational tempo in SOCOM? 
C. BACKGROUND 
Since the invasion of Panama by the United States (Operation Just Cause) in 
December 1989, the transportation of personnel and cargo behind the front line was 
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primarily through the use of High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs 
or Humvees) developed by AM General (a subsidiary of American Motors Corporation). 
Since then, these HMMWVs have been employed in numerous operations like Operation 
Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm and have proven to be able to satisfy the needs 
of the U.S. military in conventional warfare. There were limited damages to the vehicles 
and acceptable personnel losses.  
The rise of asymmetric warfare and low-intensity conflict, since the start of the 
War on Terrorism in 2001, brought about an additional requirement to the HMMWV’s 
design, which is to defend against intense small arms fire, machine guns, rocket-
propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The HMMWVs were never 
designed with this feature in mind and subsequent modifications like additional armor 
was also unable to comply with this requirement. This brought about its dismay and 
created an urgent need for new vehicles with this protection. This eventually paved the 
way for the entry of the MRAP vehicles into the inventory of the U.S. military, especially 
for the Army and Marine Corps. The first MRAP vehicle initiated into the U.S. military 
was the “Buffalo,” manufactured by Force Protection Industries Inc. (FPII), with the 
purpose of mine clearing. Since then, many requests and orders for MRAP vehicles were 
raised and processed; however, the importance of the mine protection vehicles in the war 
came on May 8, 2008, when the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that 
“the acquisition of MRAP to be the highest priority of the Department of Defense.”1 
The traditional U.S. defense acquisition programs are funded through the Program 
Planning Budgeting Execution System2 (PPBES) and Program Objective Memorandum3 
(POM) with short-term programs through the base DoD budget (Blakeman, Gibbs & 
Jeyasingam, 2008, p. 39). The funding of the MRAP vehicles, on the other hand, is 
                                                 
1 A statement written in a memo addressed to the secretaries of the Army and Navy by the U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates in early May 2007. 
2 The PPBES process is an inclusive process that ties planning, programming, budgeting, and 
execution together to ensure activities the agency undertakes are effective in meeting the DoD’s mission 
and vision. 
3 The POM document presents the proposed Army program to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
It presents planned activities and the personnel and obligation authority required over a five-year period to 
build, operate, and maintain this proposed program. 
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primarily done through supplemental appropriation and currently falls under the Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. The intent of the OCO budget request 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2009, p. 1) is to finance U.S. 
military operations around the globe in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. 
Areas of funding included under the OCO budget request are as follows: 
• Continuing the Fight 
o Operations 
o Force Protection 
o Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
o Military Intelligence 
o Afghan National Security Forces 
o Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund 
o Coalition Support 
o Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
o Military Construction 
• Reconstituting the Force 
o Reconstitution 
This research was initiated by the SOCOM to understand the potential operating 
and maintenance (O&M) cost involved in the running of their MRAP vehicles, which is 
presently funded under the OCO budget request. This thesis develops a model to estimate 
the future O&M cost when funding from the OCO budget request ceases and is shifted to 
their service’s budget. The study will assist the office in the requisition and allocation of 
funds for these vehicles or develop trade-off decisions. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To facilitate the thesis research, data were requested from the Office of Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics (DASA-CE); the Naval Center 
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for Cost Analysis (NCCA); and the MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO). From the first 
two sources the historical data on the operating & support (O&S) cost of the MRAP 
vehicles came directly from the Army’s Operating and Support Management Information 
System (OSMIS) and the Marine Corps’ VAMOSC management information system. 
From the latter, a summary was provided in terms of cost element structure (CES) of the 
MRAP program from fiscal year 2008 to 2013.  
The next step is to apply various statistical analyses in an attempt to understand 
the behavior and determine a relationship between the different variables in the data. 
Finally, this thesis attempts to answer the research questions put forth at the start of this 
chapter. All the data analyses are performed using Microsoft Excel 2007 (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2006) and the data analysis tool residing in it.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into five chapters as follows: 
• Chapter I presents the thesis objective; the primary and secondary research 
questions posted to guide the study; the background of the thesis research; and 
the methodologies used to conduct the research. 
• Chapter II conducts a review of the literature and references related to the 
MRAP vehicles program in the U.S. military. The areas investigated are the 
vehicle design; the history; the setup of the program managing office; strategy 
of acquisition; the vehicle manufacturers; the vehicle classification; and the 
maintenance concept. 
• Chapter III describes the data used for the analysis; that is those from Army’s 
OSMIS, Marine Corps VAMOSC management information system and the 
MRAP JPO; and lastly why the data from the MRAP JPO was selected as 
most suitable for the analysis. 
• Chapter IV shares with the reader the approach of the analysis, the measures 
of effectiveness (MOE) and the results. The results of the “best fit” 
relationship between the variables are displayed graphically with the achieved 
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MOEs. In addition, the chapter discusses the procurement trend and the cost 
of government furnished equipment (GFE) for each of the services. 
• Chapter V concludes the thesis with the findings from the analyses by 
answering the research questions posted in Chapter I. It also talks about the 
usefulness of this information to SOCOM for their future MRAP vehicles 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides: an explanation of the unique design used in all Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; a brief history of how MRAP vehicles 
came into the strength of the United States military; the managing team behind this 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D-designated program; the aggressive acquisition 
process for this program; an overview of the manufacturers responsible for the many 
variants of MRAP vehicles; how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) classifies them; 
and finally, the present maintenance plan for these highly-utilized vehicles.   
B. V-SHAPED HULL  
The utilization of a V-shaped hull is the only commonality among all the different 
categories of MRAP vehicles from the many manufacturers. This ingenious V-shaped 
hull design is the reason behind the high rate of survivability of the personnel in the 
MRAP vehicles during an encounter with an adversary’s land mines or improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). A V-shaped hull refers specifically to the inclination of the 
floor plates to bulge towards the floor, creating what can be called a wedge. Attributed to 
the inclination of the hull (Figure 1), when a land mine or IED explodes there is no flat 
surface to act as a target for the blast. As a result, the main effect of the blast is directed 
outwards away from the vehicle instead of towards the bottom. This is because a path of 
least resistance, which leads most of the blast and shock waves away from the vehicle, is 
formed from the inclination of the floor plates.  
Based on this reasoning, the more inclined the floor plates are, the higher the 
survivability rate of the personnel in the vehicle. There is a tradeoff though with the 
inclination angle, which is the need to maintain a minimum volume for housing the 
personnel and equipment, thus resulting in the overall height of the vehicle increasing. 
This may cause a problem for the stability, particularly prominent when turning at higher 
speeds. Another issue that comes about with a taller vehicle is the increase of the radar 
cross-section (RCS) signature of the vehicle, meaning easier detection by the enemy.   
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Figure 1.  V-shaped Hull Design of the MRAP Vehicle (From Macabees, 2008)  
C. HISTORY 
The introduction of the “Buffel” armored personnel carrier (APC) into the arsenal 
of the South African Army in 1978 brought about a new and effective way of protection 
against land mines and later IEDs. It was in this vehicle that the V-shaped hull design 
was first employed. What started as a basic mine-protected vehicle went on to become a 
success with the South African Army, and eventually more than 1,400 units were 
delivered before production ceased. 
For the U.S. military, the first MRAP vehicle that was initiated into their service 
was with the intent of mine clearing. This came about in September 2002 when the Army 
signed a contract with Force Protection Industries Inc. (FPII) to buy ten “Buffalo” at a 
value of US$6.5 million, with the delivery plan of two vehicles per year under a five-year 
contract. The effectiveness of the “Buffalo” MRAP vehicles against land mines and IEDs 
was quick to generate awareness in the U.S. DoD, with requests for them starting as early 
as 2003. Since then, many MRAP vehicle requests from the different services were 
raised. Due to budget constraints, it was only on November 9, 2006, that the first request 
for proposal (RFP) was issued to the industry to invite manufacturers to submit proposals 
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for the design. At around the same time as this RFP, in December 2006, the MRAP Joint 
Program Office (JPO) was established. Given the U.S. Marine Corps’ lead in the program 
(Blakeman, Gibbs & Jeyasingam, 2008, p. 7), the JPO was setup within the Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), and Mr. Paul Mann was transferred from the 
Naval Sea Systems Command to serve as its first program manager. MRAP vehicles 
continue to generate awareness, and their importance came in May 2007 when Mr. 
Robert Gates, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, announced through the following 
memorandum that the acquisition of MRAP vehicles was the highest priority of the DoD4  
The MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department 
of Defense acquisition program and any and all options to accelerate the 
production and fielding of this capability to the theater should be 
identified, assessed and applied where feasible. In this regard, I would like 
to know what funding, materiel, program, legal or other limits currently 
constrains the program and the options available to overcome them. This 
should include an examination of all applicable statutory authorities 
available to the Secretary of Defense or the President. (Owen, 2008, p. 14) 
D. MRAP JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE  
The MRAP Joint Program Office was established on December 6, 2006, to 
manage the acquisition, cost, and schedule of MRAP vehicles, with the mission statement 
as follows (MRAP Newsletter, 2010, p. 2):  
We deliver survivable, fully capable, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) Vehicles to our Warfighters and customers. We demand and 
support maximum readiness from our MRAP Vehicles once delivered. We 
operate with speed and a sense of urgency always. 
The organizational structure with the current staffing is as shown in Figure 2 
(Rodgers, 2010, p. 4). The office is staffed mainly by both military personnel and 
civilians from the Marine Corps and Army (indicated by a red- and green-colored 
outline respectively around the various appointments). In order to ensure that there is a 
subject matter expert (SME) from the other services in the JPO, liaisons appointments for 
SOCOM, the Navy and the Air Force are created.  
                                                 
4 A statement written in a memo by the Defense Secretary Robert Gates addressed to secretaries of the 
Army and Navy early May 2007. 
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Figure 2.  Organizational Chart of MRAP Joint Program Office (From Rodgers, 
2010). 
E. ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The acquisition strategy adopted at the onset by the JPO was to support three 
primary program objectives: “first, field survivable, mission capable vehicles; second, 
field them as rapidly as possible; and third, grow the industrial base while simultaneously 
managing all aspects of the acquisition process (Blakeman, Gibbs & Jeyasingam, 2008, p. 
26).” This strategy was the key reason for the contracting of multiple manufacturers in 
the design and production of MRAP vehicles, leading to many variants in this program.  
Unlike the traditional acquisition process which has more lead time and probably 
lesser quantity of units to produce, the MRAP program has neither. With the need to field 
these large orders as rapidly as possible, the approach was to first award a contract to a 
manufacturer with the capability at hand, in this case FPII, and simultaneously send out 
the RFP to the industry for more manufacturers to start producing these vehicles, thus 
enlarging the pool of suppliers in the long run. 
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This approach ensures unit production in the earliest possible timeframe. Designs 
from responding manufacturers were evaluated, and those that met the requirements were 
awarded with a low rate initial production (LRIP) contract. Risk assessment was then 
performed on the designs from the selected manufacturers and those deemed as “low 
risk” were instructed to start the production, concurrent to preparation for the 
development and user testing of their design. On the other hand, “high risk” 
manufacturers had to undergo the development and user testing prior to start of their 
production. Manufacturers who passed the testing phase were subsequently allowed to 
start production. Figure 3 shows the comparison in the acquisition strategy between the 






Figure 3.  Comparisons of MRAP Acquisition and Traditional Acquisition 






The issue of the RFP to the industry on November 9, 2006, resulted in nine 
manufacturers being awarded the “Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity”5 (IDIQ) 
contract on January 26, 2007. The IDIQ contract is comprised of two phases. The first 
phase involved the design and production of a small number of the manufacturer’s design 
and subjecting these vehicles through a series of demonstration tests including 
survivability, automotive, safety and user testing. Once the first phase was cleared, the 
manufacturer was granted the “go-ahead” for the production of their design in a much 
larger order. Of the nine manufacturers, two were unable to deliver the vehicles within 
sixty days for phase one testing and another two failed to pass the survivability 
specifications. At the end of the first phase of the IDIQ contract, only the five following 
manufacturers were left: 
• Armor Holdings Aerospace and Defense Group (Sealy, TX) (later 
acquired by BAE systems on July 31, 2007) 
• BAE Systems (Santa Clara, CA) 
• General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada (Ontario, Canada; 
manufactured in York, PA) 
• Force Protection Industries, Inc. (Ladson, SC)  
• International Military and Government LLC (Warrenville, IL) (now called 
Navistar Defense). 
With these five manufacturers churning out the MRAP vehicles, the requirement 
for protection against land mines and IEDs was slowly met and a new add-on request 
started to surface—that is the need for higher mobility. On December 8, 2008, the U.S. 
Army Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) (Defense Update, 2009) issued another 
RFP for a fleet of new MRAP-class of vehicles with additional features of going off-road 
and the capability to go over rough terrain. Similarly, more than one manufacturer 
responded to the request. This time, the contract was awarded solely to the design from 
Oshkosh Defense on June 30, 2009. The initial number of vehicles of the MRAP All-
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) for this contract (Defense Industry Daily, 2010) was 5,151 
                                                 
5 IDIQ (Definition in Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 16.5)—a contract for supplies that does 
not procure or specify a firm quantity of supplies (other than a minimum or maximum quantity) and that 
provides for the issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies during the period of the contract.  
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units (apart from test vehicles)—2,598 for the Army, 1,565 for the Marine Corps, 643 for 
SOCOM, 280 for Air Force, and 65 for the Navy. With Oshkosh Defense added to the 
list, the present number of manufacturers for MRAP vehicles and their specialties is as 
shown in Table 1 (Global Security, 2010).  




- MaxxPro MEAP Protected
- MaxxPro Plus (EFP 
Protected) 
- MaxxPro Plus Ambulance 
- MaxxPro Dash 





- Caiman/ XM1230  
- Caiman Plus (EFP 
Protected)/ XM1230 
- Caiman     
BAE 
Systems/Land 
Systems OMC  
- RG-33 USSOCOM 
- RG-33 USSOCOM Plus 
- RG-33L 
- RG-33L Plus (EFP 
Protected) 
- RG-33L HAGA 
- RG-33L HAGA Plus 
- RG-33L USSOCOM AUV 
    
Force Protection 
Industries  
- Cougar A1 
- Cougar A2 
- Cougar HEV 
  - Buffalo A1 







- RG-31 Mk 5E/A2 
- RG-31A3 (EM) 
      
Oshkosh 
Corporation 
   - M-ATV 
Table 1.  MRAP Vehicles Manufacturers 
G. CLASSIFICATION 
The many variants of MRAP vehicles supplied by the numerous manufacturers 
can be classified under the following four categories (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2010, p. 2): 
• Category I – used for small unit combat operations in urban or confined 
areas for missions such as mounted patrols and reconnaissance;  
• Category II – used for convoy escort, combat engineering, ambulance, 
troop and cargo transportation;  
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• Category III – used to clear IEDs/mines and are the largest MRAP 
vehicles in terms of size; and  
• MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV) – a lighter vehicle for small unit 
combat operations in restricted, mountainous and urban terrain. It supports 
mounted patrols carrying up to five personnel. 
H. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 
Due to the fast pace of the MRAP vehicles program with its primary goal of 
fielding the vehicles in the theater in the shortest time, the original sustainment plan was 
simply to rely on the contractor’s logistics support (CLS) inclusive of parts and the field 
service representative (FSR). This sustainment plan proved to be successful with high 
operational readiness of the MRAP vehicles in theater. In 2007, with the large number of 
MRAP vehicles operating in the field and on order, the JPO decided that the initial 
intended sustainment plan was not economical and had to be changed to one which was 
organic to the unit, with the transition to take place immediately. 
Since then, the maintenance plan for the MRAP vehicles program has been a 
mixture of organic maintenance operators and manufacturers’ support, performed in three 
levels, namely tactical/unit, regional support activities (RSA) and the MRAP sustainment 
facility (MSF) (in ascending order of capabilities). This is graphically illustrated in 
Figure 4. At the tactical/ unit level, the organic maintainers are supported by the FSRs in 
the day-to-day corrective maintenance, in addition to the scheduled preventive 
maintenance at this level. The degree of involvement of the FSRs depends on the service 
and unit that they are attached to. It ranges from actual maintenance of the vehicles by the 
FSRs themselves to just providing expert advice or guidance to the organic maintenance 




Figure 4.  MRAP Vehicles Maintenance in Theater (From (Kulie, 2009, p. 3)) 
There are two RSAs for the maintenance of the MRAP vehicles theater, 
geographically located in Iraq (Figure 5) and Afghanistan (Figure 6). Both locations 
perform different functions for the program. In the Iraq RSA, it has the capabilities to 
carry out “responsible drawdown,” namely “Scorpion Cascade for Home Station 
Training” (HST) and off-ramp equipment to Afghanistan; battle damage repair and 
sustainment maintenance; product improvements; and “sweep” the fleet. For the RSA in 
Afghanistan, it has the capabilities of fielding, sustainment, battle damage repair, facility 
infrastructure build-up, and a Joint Solutions Support Center (JSSC). The JSSC is a total 
package-fielding warehouse, so that prescribed load lists (PLLs) and parts to support 
fielding can be packaged. 
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Figure 5.  Regional Support Activities (RSA) in Iraq (From Kulie, 2009, p. 7)  
 
Figure 6.  Regional Support Activities (RSA) in Afghanistan (From Kulie, 2009, 
p. 8) 
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The MRAP sustainment facility (MSF) is located in Kuwait (See Figure 7). 
Maintenance tasks that are beyond the ability of the RSAs are performed in this facility. 
The capabilities available in this facility include home station training, sustainment of 
theater vehicles stock, vehicle refurbishment, fleet training, unit fielding, capability 
insertion and independent suspension upgrades for FPII’s Cougar MRAP vehicle. This 
facility is fully equipped since there has been continuous presence of U.S. forces in this 
country since the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  
Table 2 shows the expected tasks to be performed and the capabilities at the 
operator, field and sustainment level extracted from the MRAP Vehicle user’s logistics 








Organizational (Operator Crew Level) Maintenance Capability  
 
O-Level tasks consist of planned and/or corrective maintenance actions performed by the 
operating crews and will generally include:  
 
a) Preventive maintenance checks and services such as inspections, lubrication, cleaning, 
preserving, tightening, checking and topping off fluid levels, inspecting fittings and 
connectors, fuse replacement, and performing minor adjustments with common shop 
tools.  
b) Limited troubleshooting and repair.  
c) Monitoring and reporting system conditions.  
 
Maintenance at this level will be conducted on-site by crewmembers, whether deployed or at 
home base. Approximately 90 percent of all malfunctions will be detectable and correctable at the 
organizational level.  
 
Intermediate (Field Level) Maintenance  
 
I-Level is defined as maintenance tasks that are beyond the capability of the operating crews. 
Maintenance at this level will be performed by specially trained mechanics and technicians. 
Intermediate maintenance includes:  
 
a) Inspection/in-depth diagnosis, modification, replacement, adjustment, and limited repair 
or evacuation/disposal of principal end items and their selected repairable, 
components/subcomponents.  
b) Calibration and repair of test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE), 
including fabrication of items, precision machining, and various methods of welding.  
 
Maintenance at this level will be conducted in a semi-protected environment on-site whether 
deployed or at home base.  
 
Depot (Sustainment Level) Maintenance  
 
D-Level maintenance tasks are to sustain equipment throughout its lifecycle by performing:  
 
a) Major repair, overhaul, or complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, assemblies, or 
principal end items.  
b) Manufacturing parts and conducting required modifications, testing, calibrating, and 
reclaiming.  
c) Supports lower-level maintenance by providing overflow maintenance services and 
performing on-site maintenance services including technical assistance when required.  
 
Maintenance at this level requires a multi-commodity maintenance center, other services depots, 
commercial industrial facilities, OEMs, or a combination thereof to perform this level of 
maintenance. 
 
Table 2.  Maintenance Tasks at the Different Level (From Naval Facilities 
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III. DATA SOURCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the cost data of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicles that were used in the analysis. The initial approach to this thesis was to 
use the data from the records of the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs (VAMOSC) management information system, since this is where the operating and 
support (O&S) cost data for the major systems in the United States military are stored. 
This direction proved to be infeasible as the relationship between the variables of the 
collected data (to-date) could not be correlated with reasonable statistical significance. 
The data that was finally used in the analysis came from the MRAP Joint Program Office 
(JPO).  
This chapter is divided into two sections: the data from the Army’s Operating and 
Support Management Information System (OSMIS) and the Marine Corps’ VAMOSC 
management information system, and the data from the MRAP JPO. 
B. DATA FROM ARMY OSMIS AND MARINE CORPS VAMOSC  
The general term for the program of managing of the O&S cost in the U.S. 
military is known as VAMOSC management information system. It was started in 1975 
and is presently handled by the respective services. Under the guidance of “DoD Cost 
Analysis Guidance and Procedures,” (DoD 5000.4M) each service (Cheshire, 2003, p. 1) 
has developed a system based on the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group’s (CAIG) 
cost element structure. For the Army, this data is managed with the use of the OSMIS 
under the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics 
(DASA-CE). For Marine Corps, this responsibility belongs to the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis (NCCA) and the center uses the Marine Corps VAMOSC management 
information system.  
The approach to estimating the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) MRAP 
operating & maintenance (O&M) cost was to use the data from the Army and Marine 
Corps as analogies to SOCOM, and then translate it across, since SOCOM does not have 
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a VAMOSC management information system. This is considered a reasonable 
methodology, as the combined total number of MRAP vehicles in the Army and Marine 
Corps accounts for more than 80% of the whole fleet in the U.S. military. To begin the 
analysis, a set of historical data (shown in Appendix A) on the operating of MRAP 
vehicles in the Army and Marine Corps was obtained from both the OSMIS and the 
Marine Corps VAMOSC management information system. The idea was to find a 
relationship between the cost and the number of MRAP vehicles operated in the two 
services. The analyses on the scatter plots (Appendix B) of the data were that the 
variables cannot be linked in a statistically significant way. This finding effectively 
concludes that the current data in the OSMIS and the Marine Corps VAMOSC 
management information system on MRAP vehicles do not provide a reasonable baseline 
for use in future sustainment cost estimations of SOCOM. The “no pattern” behavior in 
the data from OSMIS and the Marine Corps VAMOSC management information system 
could be due to the problem in the data collection process, probably caused by the fast 
acquisition and fielding rates of the program. When the program matures and reaches a 
steady-state stage, it may be more worthwhile to perform another analysis based on the 
data from these systems. It is important to determine the exact cause of this behavior, 
since the database is the “backbone” for the estimation of future sustainment in the U.S. 
military.   
C. DATA FROM MRAP JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE 
A summary of the expenditures for the MRAP vehicles program was obtained 
from the MRAP JPO. This summary provides the previously spent and expected figures 
for research development test & evaluation (RDT&E) (CES 1.0); procurement (CES 2.0); 
military construction (MILCON) (CES 3.0); military personnel (CES 4.0); and operating 
& maintenance (CES 5.0) for fiscal years (FY) 2008 to 2013. The data from FY 2010 
onwards was omitted from the analysis, since they are forecasts from the MRAP JPO. 
This section provides a description of all the cost elements funded under operating 
& maintenance (CES 5.0), disregarding the rest of the cost elements since the questions 
to be answered are on the O&M cost of the MRAP vehicles. 
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There are fifteen different cost elements classified under the operating & 
maintenance (CES 5.0) element (Table 3), with their descriptions (MRAP JPO, 
PowerPoint presentation, 2010, slides 5–22) as follows: 
• Field Maintenance (CES 5.1) – This element captures the cost of the in-
theater field service representatives (FSRs). It is comprised of the 
manpower and personnel requirements to operate and maintain the MRAP 
vehicles.   
• System Specific Base Ops (CES 5.2) – This element includes the cost to 
maintain the facilities supporting the MRAP vehicles in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Kuwait. 
• Replenishment Spares (Reparables) (CES 5.3) – This element includes the 
costs of material used to repair the fleet of MRAP vehicles. 
• Replenishment Repair Parts (Consumables) (CES 5.4) – This element 
includes the cost of material consumed in the maintenance and support of 
the fleet of MRAP vehicles. 
• Petroleum, Oil & Lube (POL) (CES 5.5) – This element takes into account 
the cost of the petroleum, oil and lubricant consumed in the maintenance 
and support of the fleet of MRAP vehicles. 
• Sustainment Overhauls (CES 5.6) – This element encompass the 
sustainment overhauls performed at the MRAP Sustainment Facility 
(MSF) and only on vehicles in theater. 
• Transportation to/from Theater (CES 5.7) – This element includes the 
transportation of vehicles and parts to theater, and transportation of 
vehicles home from theater. 
• Software (CES 5.8) – This element deals with the labor, material, and 
overhead costs incurred after deployment in supporting the update, 
maintenance and modification, integration and configuration management 
of software. 
• System Test & Evaluation (CES 5.9) – The use of prototype, production, 
or specifically fabricated hardware/software to obtain or validate 
engineering data on the performance of the system during the development 
phase (normally funded from RDT&E) of the program. It also includes all 
effort associated with the design and production of models, specimens, 
fixtures, and instrumentation in support of the system level test program. 
• Government/Contractor Program Management (CES 5.10) – This element 
includes the cost of the personnel who are supporting the MRAP JPO from 
both the government and contractor. Also included in this element are 
facilities and miscellaneous costs funded by the JPO. 
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• Training (CES 5.11) – This element includes all the costs for all of the 
training for the MRAP program. It includes the recurring cost of the 
MRAP University (that is facilities, supplies, tools, equipment and 
personnel), unique ambulance training, etc. 
• Contractor Maintenance Support (CES 5.12) – This element is comprised 
of the cost involved in the in-theater contractor logistics support (CLS). It 
is only applicable to SOCOM. 
• Lease Services & Equipment (CES 5.13) – This element contains all the 
cost associated with the leasing of services and equipment in theater for 
this program. 
• Disposal/Demilitarization (CES 5.14) – This element includes the cost of 
disposing and demilitarization of the in-theater MRAP vehicles. 
• Other Matters (CES 5.15) – This element is comprised of that which is not 
covered under the above cost elements. It includes storage, transportation 
to storage, data manuals, etc. 
From Table 3, there are two obvious observations. First, some of the cost 
elements do not incur spending for the period of FY 2008 and FY 2009. This means that 
the funding for these cost elements has either passed or yet to come. As a result, there is 
no way of understanding or analyzing these cost elements. Secondly, “Transportation to 
Theater” (CES 5.7.1) is the only cost incurred for the MRAP vehicles program in FY 
2008. With the absence of funding for the rest of the cost elements in FY 2008, it can be 
deduced that this is the year in which all (if not most) of the MRAP vehicles from the 
various services were transported to theater. Thus, going forward the analysis in the 
following chapter will only utilize the O&M data from FY 2009. 
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  USMC Army Navy Air Force SOCOM 
CES Element FY08 FY09 FY08 FY09 FY08 FY09 FY08 FY09 FY08 FY09 
5.0 O&M Funded Elements $425,281 $357,188 $487,000 $1,223,114 $17,985 $56,937 $12,947 $77,862 $56,951 $149,321 
5.1 Field Maintenance 
Civilian/Contractor Labor Below 
Sustainment 
$0 $39,500 $0 $199,000 $0 $6,000 $0 $14,300 $0 $18,182 
5.2 System Specific Base Ops $0 $7,981 $0 $31,036 $0 $1,274 $0 $1,576 $0 $2,176 
5.3 Replenishment Spares 
(Reparables) 
$0 $35,000 $0 $200,000 $0 $10,242 $0 $10,153 $0 $21,130 
5.4 Replenishment Repair Parts 
(Consumables) 
$0 $40,000 $0 $270,000 $0 $14,625 $0 $14,499 $0 $30,175 
5.5 Petroleum, Oil & Lube (POL) $0 $6,807 $0 $31,832 $0 $1,456 $0 $1,420 $0 $1,246 
5.6 Sustainment Overhauls $0 $51,269 $0 $100,000 $0 $10,898 $0 $11,034 $0 $19,978 
5.7.1 Transportation to Theater $135,745 $82,000 $487,000 $240,000 $17,985 $3,426 $12,947 $10,301 $56,951 $8,000 
5.7.2 Transportation from Theater $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
5.8 Software $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
5.9 System Test & Evaluation $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
5.10.1 Government Program 
Management 
$0 $37,000 $0 $25,000 $0 $491 $0 $1,985 $0 $2,000 
5.10.2 Development Contractor Program 
Management 
$0 $21,757 $0 $0 $0 $3,474 $0 $4,296 $0 $5,933 
5.11 Training $0 $29,503 $0 $99,124 $0 $3,880 $0 $7,000 $0 $10,000 
5.12 Contractor Maintenance & 
Support 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $29,000 
5.13 Leased Services & Equipment $0 $834 $0 $3,242 $0 $133 $0 $165 $0 $227 
5.14 Disposal/ Demilitarization $0 $2,758 $0 $13,071 $0 $594 $0 $586 $0 $516 
5.15.1 Storage $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
5.15.2 Maintenance $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
5.15.3 Transportation to Storage $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
5.15.4 Data Manuals $0 $2,779 $0 $10,808 $0 $444 $0 $549 $0 $758 
Table 3.  O&M-Funded Elements for All the Services
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the analytical approach, the qualification criteria and the 
results of the regression analysis performed on the fifteen cost elements under the 
operating & maintenance (CES 5.0) funded elements for FY 2009 cost data from the 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Joint Program Office (JPO). In addition, it 
looks at the procurement trend of the MRAP vehicles by examining the low rate initial 
production (LRIP) procurement prices for the period of FY 2007 to 2008 and discusses 
the cost of government furnished equipment (GFE) among the services for the data from 
FY 2008. 
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
1. Method 
The first step in the regression analysis is to determine the type of 
relationship (linear, non-linear, quadratic) between each cost element (dependent 
variable) and the number of MRAP vehicles in operation (independent variable). 
This is done simply by visual inspection of the scatter plot of the dependent 
variable versus the independent variable. Then, once a relationship has been 
identified, the mathematical function (e.g., linear) linking the dependent and 
independent variables is subjected to a series of statistical examinations to 
evaluate the strength of this relationship. If the function does not meet the passing 
criterions of the statistical examinations, another function (e.g., non-linear) is 
devised. The process continues until the passing criterions for the statistical 
examinations are met or there is no more improvement. At this stage, the “best 
fit” function between the variables is found.  
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
In order to statistically “accept” a selected mathematical function and 
consider it to be suitable for representing the relationship between the cost 
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element and the number of vehicles, a set of passing criteria or measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) have to be established. For this analysis, the following are 
employed: 
• F-test – this indicates whether the mathematical function is preferred to 
the mean of the dependent variable. That is, whether the coefficients of all 
the independent variables are zero (Nussbaum, PowerPoint presentation, 
2009, slide 24).  A p-value of less than 0.05 is desired. 
• t-test – this test is used to assess the strength of the relationship between 
the dependent variable and independent variables at a given level of 
significance.  A p-value of less than 0.05 is desired. 
• Coefficient of Determination (R2) – this is used in the context of statistical 
models where the main purpose is the prediction of future outcomes on the 
basis of other related information. It is the proportion of variability in a 
data set that is accounted for by the statistical model. It provides a measure 
of how well future outcomes are likely to be predicted by the model. The 
desired value is set to be greater than 0.9 (Steel & Torrie, 1960, pp. 187, 
287). 
• Adjusted Coefficient of Determination (adj R2) – this is a modification of 
the R2 that adjusts for the number of explanatory terms in the model. 
Unlike R2, the adjusted R2 increases only if the new term improves the 
model more than would be expected by chance. The adjusted R2 can be 
negative and will always be less than or equal to R2. The desired value is 
set to be greater than 0.9 (Benchimol, 2008, p. 2). 
3. Results 
For the regression analysis, a series of mathematical functions were fitted 
to the relationship between each of the cost elements (dependent variable) and the 
number of operated vehicles (independent variable), and the results of the “best 
fit” function (details in Appendix C) are shown as follows: 
• CES 5.1 Field Maintenance (as shown in Figure 8) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 7.440E-5 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 7.440E-5 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.222 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.997 
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o Adjusted coefficient of Determination (adj R2) = 0.996 
o Function: y = 4402965.4 + 14681.1 x 
Inference: There is an apparent linear relationship between the cost 
incurred in “Field Maintenance” and the number of operated MRAP 
vehicles. Due to the paucity of the underlying data used in the analysis, 
the regression line is not statistically significant. The high p-value of 
the t-test (intercept) and the wide confidence interval (-4.7 to 13.5 
million, highlighted in Table 9) confirmed the finding. The number of 
MRAPs alone is not a good variable for estimating the cost for this 
element.   
Observation: The prediction error of this function is approximately 
50% for SOCOM in FY 2009, while it is less than 5% for the Army 
and the Marine Corps. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.1 Field Maintenance (FY09) 
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• CES 5.2 System Specific Base Ops (as shown in Figure 9) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 1.241E-4 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 1.241E-4 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.220 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.996 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.994 
o Function: y = 823913.5 + 2298.8 x 
Inference: The regression model between the cost incurred in “System 
Specific Base Ops” and the number of operated MRAP vehicles 
appears to be linear and can be misleading. The high p-value of the t-
test (intercept) and the confidence interval (-0.9 to 2.5 million, 
highlighted in Table 10) reveal that the best-fitted function is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the number of MRAPs alone is not 
a good variable for estimating the cost for this element.   
Observation: For this cost element, the prediction error obtained for 
SOCOM is about 6%. 
 
Figure 9.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.2 System Specific Base Ops (FY09) 
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• CES 5.3 Replenishment Spares (Reparables) (as shown in Figure 10) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 7.440E-5 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 7.440E-5 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.222 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.997 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.996 
o Function: y = 4163806.1 + 14723.6 x 
Inference: The apparent relationship between the cost incurred in 
“Replenishment Spares (Reparables)” and the number of operated 
MRAP vehicles is linear. Due to the paucity of the underlying data 
used in the analysis, the regression line is not statistically significant.  
The p-value of the t-test (intercept) and the confidence interval (-4.7 to 
13.5 million, highlighted in Table 11) substantiate this result. The 
number of MRAPs alone is not a good variable for estimating the cost 
for this element.   
Observation: An error of about 75% is seen when using this function 
for the cost estimation for SOCOM in FY 2009, while it is less than 
1% for the Army. 
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Figure 10.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.3 Reparable (FY09) 
• CES 5.4 Replenishment Repair Parts (Consumable) (as shown in 
Figure 11) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 3.650E-4 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 3.650E-4 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.513 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.991 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.988 
o Function: y = 4891670.5 + 19856.1 x 
Inference: Similarly, the apparent relationship between the cost 
incurred in “Replenishment Repair Parts (Consumable)” and the 
number of operated MRAP vehicles is linear. The p-value of the t-test 
(intercept) and the confidence interval (-16.1 to 25.9 million, 
highlighted in Table 12) are indicative that the regression model is not 
statistically significant. The number of MRAPs alone is not a good 
variable for estimating the cost for this element.   
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Observation: The prediction error of this function is almost double 
when used on the FY 2009 data for SOCOM, while it is less than 7% 
for the Air Force, Navy, and Army.  
 
 
Figure 11.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.4 Consumable (FY09) 
• CES 5.5 Petroleum, Oil & Lubricant (POL) (as shown in Figure 12) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 3.479E-6 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 3.479E-6 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.281 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 1.000 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 1.000 
o Function: y = 217443.0 + 2355.0 x 
Inference: The relationship between the cost incurred in “Petroleum, 
Oil & Lubricant (POL)” and the number of operated MRAP vehicles is 
found to be linear. This is due to the paucity of the underlying data 
used in the analysis. The p-value of the t-test (intercept) as well as 
confidence interval (-0.3 to 0.7 million, highlighted in Table 13) 
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verified that the function is not statistically significant. The number of 
MRAPs alone is not a good variable for estimating the cost for this 
element.   
Observation: Using this function for the prediction of the cost for 
SOCOM produces an error of 17%, while it is less than 5% for the 




Figure 12.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.5 POL (FY09) 
• CES 5.6 Sustainment Overhauls (as shown in Figure 13) 
o Best Fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 0.011 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 0.011 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.114 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.912 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.883 
o Function: y = 15755830.8 + 6587.2 x 
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Inference: The identified linear relationship between the cost incurred in 
“Sustainment Overhauls” and the number of operated MRAP vehicles is 
not statistically significant due to the paucity of the underlying data used 
in the analysis.  The p-value of the t-test (intercept) and the wide 
confidence interval (-6.9 to 38.4 million, highlighted in Table 14) confirm 
that the regression line is not statistically significant. 
Observation: The prediction error of this function is acceptable for 
SOCOM, at less than 5%. 
 
Figure 13.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.6 Sustainment Overhaul (FY09) 
• CES 5.7.1 Transportation to Theater (as shown in Figure 14) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 2.174E-3 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 2.174E-3 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.615 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.970 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.961 
o Function: y = 6125445.0 + 18028.4 x 
Inference: Due to the small sample size used in the analysis, the 
relationship between the cost incurred in “Transportation to Theater” 
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and the number of operated MRAP vehicles is shown to be linear. This 
regression model can be misleading. The high p-value of the intercept 
and the confidence interval (-28.8 to 41.0 million, highlighted in Table 
15) support this finding. The number of MRAPs alone is not a good 
variable for estimating the cost for this element.   
Observation: The prediction error of this function is approximately 




Figure 14.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.7.1 Transportation to Theater (FY09) 
• CES 5.7.2 Transportation from Theater – no data. 
• CES 5.8 Software – no data. 
• CES 5.9 System Test & Evaluation – no data. 
• CES 5.10.1 Government Program Management (as shown in Figure 
15) 
o Best fitted relationship – quadratic 
o p-value of F-test = 1.579E-3 
o p-value of t-test (non-quadratic term) = 9.608E-4 
o p-value of t-test (quadratic term) = 1.096E-3 
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o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.006 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.998 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.997 
Inference: A quadratic relationship is found to fit all the data points for 
this cost element. This relationship, however, does not explain why 
with more vehicles the cost decreases. Further investigation (MRAP 
JPO, PowerPoint presentation, 2010, slide 14) reveals that this element 
is funded in accordance to the service staffing in the MRAP JPO, and 
the high cost in the Marine Corps is due to the fact that the JPO is 
staffed mainly with personnel from the Marine Corps. As a result, this 




Figure 15.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.10.1 Govt Program Mgt (FY09) 
• CES 5.10.2 Development Contractor Program Management (as shown 
in Figure 16) 
o Best fitted relationship – quadratic 
o p-value of F-test = 1.138E-2 
o p-value of t-test (non-quadratic term) = 0.007 
o p-value of t-test (quadratic term) = 0.006 
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o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.353 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.989 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.977 
• Inference: This is the same as CES 5.10.1, in that the element is 
funded in accordance to the service staffing in the MRAP JPO. Thus, 
an attempt should not be made to explain this element using a 
mathematical function. 
 
Figure 16.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.10.2 Development Contractor Program 
Mgt (FY09) 
• CES 5.11 Training (as shown in Figure 17) 
o Best fitted relationship = linear 
o p-value of F-test = 5.172E-4 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 5.172E-4 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.165 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.989 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.985 
o Function: y = 491311.0 + 7194.2 x 
Inference: Due to the paucity of the underlying data used in the 
analysis, a linear relationship is found to conform to the data points in 
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“Training.” This regression model is, however, unable to explain the 
high p-value of the intercept as well as a wide confidence interval (-3.7 
to 13.5 million, highlighted in Table 18) obtained.   
Observation: The prediction error of this function is unacceptable to 
use for the estimation of this cost element for SOCOM. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.11 Training (FY09) 
• CES 5.12 Contractor Maintenance & Support – SOCOM is the only 
service funding this element, due to their in-theater contractor logistics 
support (CLS) agreement. 
• CES 5.13 Leased Services & Equipment (as shown in Figure 18) 
o Best fitted relationship = linear 
o p-value of F-test = 1.241E-4 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 1.241E-4 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.220 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.996 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.994 
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o Function: y = 86077.3 + 240.2 x 
Inference: There is an apparent linear relationship between the cost 
incurred in “Leased Services & Equipment” and the number of 
operated MRAP vehicles. The high p-value of the intercept as well as 
a wide confidence interval (-0.091 to 0.263 million) (highlighted in 
Table 19) indicate that the regression line is not statistically 
significant. The number of MRAPs alone is not a good variable for 
estimating the cost for this element.   
Observation: This function is acceptable for SOCOM, since the 




Figure 18.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.13 Leased Services & Equipment 
(FY09) 
• CES 5.14 Disposal (as shown in Figure 19) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 4.104E-6 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 4.104E-6 
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o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.303 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 1.000 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 1.000 
o Function: y = 90547.2 + 983.0 x 
Inference: The obvious relationship between the cost incurred in 
“Disposal” and the number of operated MRAP vehicles is linear. This 
is caused by the shortage of data used in the analysis. The high p-value 
of the intercept and wide confidence interval (-0.14 to 0.32 million) 
(highlighted in Table 20) are indicative that the regression line is not 
statistically significant. The number of MRAPs alone is not a good 
variable for estimating the cost for this element.   
Observation: The prediction error of this function is approximately 
17% for SOCOM in FY 2009, while it is acceptable for the Army, Air 




Figure 19.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.14 Disposal (FY09) 
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• CES 5.15.1 Storage – no data. 
• CES 5.15.2 Maintenance – no data. 
• CES 5.15.3 Transportation to Storage – no data. 
• CES 5.15.4 Data Manuals (as shown in Figure 20) 
o Best fitted relationship – linear 
o p-value of F-test = 1.241E-4 
o p-value of t-test (independent variable) = 1.241E-4 
o p-value of t-test (intercept) = 0.220 
o Coefficient of determination (R2) = 0.996 
o Adjusted coefficient of determination (adj R2) = 0.994 
o Function: y = 286924.4 + 800.6 x 
Inference: There is an apparent linear relationship between the cost 
incurred in “Disposal” and the number of operated MRAP vehicles. 
Due to the paucity of the underlying data used in the analysis, the 
regression line is not statistically significant. The high p-value of the 
intercept and the wide confidence interval (-0.30 to 0.88 million, 
highlighted in Table 21) support the outcome.  
Observation: The prediction error of this function is approximately 5% 
for SOCOM in FY 2009, implying that it is acceptable for the costing 
of this element. 
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Figure 20.  Regression Analysis for CES 5.15.4 Data Manuals (FY09) 
C. PROCUREMENT TREND  
This section involves the use of learning curve analysis to determine the 
production trend in the procurement of MRAP vehicles for the period of FY 2007 to 
2008. The learning curve analysis is based on the principle that an individual gets better 
and better when he/she performs the same task over and over again. This phenomenon 
was first reported by T.P Wright in 1936 (Wright, 1936, pp. 122–128). The slope of the 
learning curve varies with the task to be performed. The same task in a different industry 
will yield a different learning curve slope. Table 4 (Heizer & Render, PowerPoint 
presentation, 2008, slides 7–8) shows some examples of the learning curve slope seen in 
the different industries. A low percentage value in the slope of the learning curve means 
that there is significant learning in the process, while a high percentage, on the other 













Price Units produced 86 
Aircraft Assembly Direct labors-hours 
per unit 
Units produced 80 
Equipment 
Maintenance at GE 
Average time to 





Steel Production Production worker 
labor-hours per unit 
produced 
Units produced 79 
Integrated Circuits Average price per unit Units produced 72 
Handheld Calculator Average factory 
selling price 
Units produced 74 
Disk Memory Drives Average price per bit Number of bits 76 
Heart Transplants 1-year death rates Transplant 
completed 
79 
Table 4.  Examples of Learning Curve Slopes 
The data obtained from the JPO on the LRIP procurement prices for the period of 
FY 2007 to 2008 on the Category (CAT) I, II, and II MRAP vehicles are shown in 
Appendix D, sorted by contract date in chronological order. For the CAT I MRAP 
vehicles, there were five manufacturers contracted during the period of FY 2007 and 
2008, namely Armor Holding Aerospace and Defense Group (later acquired by BAE 
systems); British Aerospace Engineering Systems; General Dynamics Land Systems; 
Force Protection Industries Inc.; and International Military and Government LLC, with 
varying orders and quantities. The total number of vehicles ordered was 11,225 
amounting to $5,681,158,509, which averages about $506,117 per vehicle.  
By applying the learning curve analysis to this data, the curve in Figure 21 is 
obtained. From computation, the learning curve slope for the CAT I MRAP vehicles for 
the FY 2007 to FY 2008 is found to be only 99.9%. This rate of learning indicates that 
the DoD did not use the learning curve analysis in the acquisition of MRAPs, considering 
that there are nineteen LRIP contracts signed and 11,225 vehicles to be produced, even 




Figure 21.  Learning Curve for CAT I MRAP Vehicles 
Similarly, the learning curves for CAT II and III MRAP vehicles can be 
calculated and are shown in Figures 22 and 23. Likewise, the rate of learning is low with 
the learning curve slopes for the CAT II and III MRAP vehicles for FY 2007 to FY 2008 
at 98.3% and 100% respectively. It is noted that there are significantly lesser number of 
vehicles contracted under CAT II and III. However, this does not explain the fact that 
there is zero learning (depicted by the horizontal straight line in Figure 23) for the CAT 
III MRAP vehicles. These learning curve slopes obtained for all the MRAP vehicles from 
FY 2007 to 2008 are indicative that there is limited to no improvement in the 




Learning curve eqn = 512134x-0.00095 
Slope = 99.9% 
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Figure 22.  Learning Curve CAT II MRAP Vehicles 
  
Figure 23.  Learning Curve CAT III MRAP Vehicles 
Learning curve eqn = 586181x-0.02514
Slope = 98.3% 
Learning curve eqn = 699139x-1 
Slope = 100.0% 
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D. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT  
Government furnished equipment (GFE) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineer, 2009, p. 
2) refers to equipment in the possession of or acquired directly by the government and 
subsequently delivered to or made available to the contractor for use or for incorporation 
into the contractor’s work. 
Figure 24 shows the cost of the GFE per vehicle incurred by the different services 
in FY 2008, with the detail on the type of GFEs installed on the vehicles for each service 
found in Appendix E. The average unit cost of the MRAP vehicle is about $500,000, with 
different services incurring different costs for their GFE. The ratio of the GFE cost to the 
acquisition cost is shown above the bar, and it can be seen that the cost of the GFE is in 
the range of 50% to 60% of the acquisition cost for all the services except SOCOM. In 
fact, SOCOM appears to spend the same amount on GFE as the basic cost of one single 
vehicle.  
 
Figure 24.  Ratio of GFE to Acquisition Cost for FY 2008 
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The data in Appendix E also exhibits the following two additional observations: 
• Most of the GFE under SOCOM is unique to them and the commonality 
of this equipment with other services is limited.  
• Even though some of the services share similar equipment, the cost 
incurred is different. A reason for this could be that the order quantity is 
different. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to answer the questions posted at the start of the thesis, 
discusses how the results of the analyses will be beneficial to Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) for the future Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles 
sustainment cost estimation, and identifies areas with potential for future research. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
This section uses the finding of the thesis research to answer the questions asked 
at the beginning of the research. 
1. Primary Research Question 
• Question: What parametric/statistical cost-estimating models (e.g., linear 
or non-linear regression) can explain and be used to predict the future 
maintenance cost of the MRAP vehicles under the inventory of SOCOM? 
Two known sets of MRAP vehicle data – from the VAMOSC management 
information system and the MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO) were obtained for use in 
building a regression model to predict the future maintenance cost of MRAP vehicles 
under the inventory of SOCOM. From the better data set, which is from the MRAP JPO, 
the following regression equations (shown in Table 5) were obtained. Due to the paucity 








CES Description Function 
5.1 Field Maintenance y = 4402965.4 + 14681.1 x 
5.2 System Specific Base Ops y = 823913.5 + 2298.8 x 
5.3 Replenishment Spares (Reparables) y = 4163806.1 + 14723.6 x 
5.4 Replenishment Repair Parts 
(Consumables) 
y = 4891670.5 + 19856.1 x 
5.5 Petroleum, Oil & Lube (POL) y = 217443.0 + 2355.0 x 
5.6 Sustainment Overhauls y = 15755830.8 + 6587.2 x 
5.7.1 Transportation to Theater y = 6125445.0 + 18028.4 x 
5.7.2 Transportation from Theater No data 
5.8 Software No data 
5.9 System Test & Evaluation No data 
5.10.1 Government Program Management Based on service staffing.  
5.10.2 Development Contractor Program 
Management 
Based on service staffing. 
5.11 Training y = 491311.0 + 7194.2 x 
5.12 Contractor Maintenance & Support Only SOCOM is funding this 
element. 
5.13 Leased Services & Equipment y = 86077.3 + 240.2 x 
5.14 Disposal y = 90547.2 + 983.0 x 
5.15.1 Storage No data 
5.15.2 Maintenance No data 
5.15.3 Transportation to Storage No data 
5.15.4 Data Manuals y = 286924.4 + 800.6 x 
Table 5.  Cost Element Relationship (Note: y represents the Cost in $(FY 2009); x 
represents the Number of Operated MRAP Vehicles) 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• Question One: How much does SOCOM spend annually on running of the 
MRAP vehicles that are in their inventory? 
The actual data from the MRAP JPO shows that SOCOM incurred a cost of about 
$150 million in FY 2009 for running 538 MRAP vehicles. Without having more reliable 
data, estimation can be based on the equations identified in Table 5. However, great care 
needs to be exercised in the use of the models. 
• Question Two: How does SOCOM’s spending compare to that of the other 
services (i.e. Marine Corps, Army, etc.) or other vehicles (similar function or 
class) within the service? 
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The cost per vehicle for all the cost elements for FY 2009 data is shown in Figure 
24 and Table 6. Comparing among the services, SOCOM is observed to have the highest 
cost per vehicle in the following cost elements (10 out of the total of 14 cost elements 
that were analyzed): 
o Field Maintenance Civilian/Contractor Labor Below Sustainment (CES 
5.1) – This element captures the cost of the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) field support representatives (FSRs) who are 
supporting the maintenance of the vehicles. SOCOM has the highest cost 
per vehicle in this category because their MRAP vehicles are completely 
maintained by FSRs while the rest of the services employ a hybrid 
arrangement of FSRs and organic maintainers; 
o System Specific Base Ops (CES 5.2) – This element captures the recurring 
cost of maintaining the facilities in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan. This 
cost is proportional to the fleet size operated by the different services; 
o Replenishment Spares (Reparable) (CES 5.3) – The parts for SOCOM’s 
vehicles are provided by contractors through the contractor logistics 
support (CLS) agreement, while the other services obtain their reparable 
parts through the standard logistics demand and requisition;  
o Replenishment Repair Parts (Consumables) (CES 5.4) – The consumables 
for SOCOM’s vehicles are provided by the contractors owing to the 
contractor logistics support (CLS) agreement; 
o Sustainment Overhauls (CES 5.6) – This element deals with the cost of the 
vehicle overhaul (parts and labor) performed at the MRAP Sustainment 
Facility (MSF) in Kuwait. The apparent reason for the high cost by 
SOCOM is due to their unique concept of operation (CONOPS), which 
translates to having special equipment (See Appendix E) and thus the 
refurbishment cost is higher;  
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o Development Contractor Program Management (CES 5.10.2) – The 
amount that SOCOM incurred in this cost element is directly related to the 
number of liaison appointments that they have in the MRAP JPO and thus 
would not be explained with an equation; 
o Training (CES 5.11) – This element covers the cost of the new equipment 
trainers (NET) and the recurring cost (i.e., facilities, supplies, tools, 
equipment, and contractor personnel) of the MRAP University. It can be 
deduced that the high cost per vehicle incurred by SOCOM is due to the 
customized training for their unique CONOPS; 
o Contractor Maintenance & Support (CES 5.12) – SOCOM is the only 
service that is funding this cost element due to their CLS agreement; 
o Leased Services & Equipment (CES 5.13) – This element predominately 
covers the leases of non-tactical vehicles (e.g., SUV) in the theater. These 
non-tactical vehicles are used mainly by the in-theater civilians, including 
the FSRs, and the reason why SOCOM is high in this category is because 
they have more FSRs per vehicle for reason mentioned in CES 5.1 
(previous paragraph); and  
o Data Manuals (CES 5.15.4) – This element includes the cost of data 
manual updates driven by the engineering change proposals. SOCOM is 
the highest because most of their changes are unique while the rest of the 
services share similar changes and thereby have lower costs. 
It can be seen from the above that the reason for the high cost per vehicle 
spending by SOCOM is probably due to their CLS agreement and their unique CONOPS, 





Figure 25.  Comparison of Spending (FY2009) 
• Question Three: How does this spending vary with the operational tempo 
in SOCOM? 
From the “Petroleum, Oil & Lube” (CES 5.5) expenditure of FY 2009 data (Table 
6), it can be deduced that the operational tempo is similar for that year. However, this 
thesis is unable to answer further questions on this issue, due to the lack of historical data 





  USMC Army Navy Air Force SOCOM  
CES Element FY09 FY09 FY09 FY09 FY09  
5.0 O&M Funded Elements Cost/ Vech Cost/ Vech Cost/ Vech Cost/ Vech Cost/ Vech Highest 
5.1 
Field Maintenance Civilian/Contractor 
Labor Below Sustainment $15,731 $15,035 $11,029 $26,580 $33,796 SOCOM 
5.2 System Specific Base Ops $3,178 $2,345 $2,342 $2,929 $4,045 SOCOM 
5.3 Replenishment Spares (Reparables) $13,939 $15,110 $18,826 $18,872 $39,275 SOCOM 
5.4 
Replenishment Repair Parts 
(Consumables) $15,930 $20,399 $26,885 $26,950 $56,088 SOCOM 
5.5 Petroleum, Oil & Lube (POL) $2,711 $2,405 $2,677 $2,640 $2,315  USMC 
5.6 Sustainment Overhauls $20,418 $7,555 $20,034 $20,508 $37,134 SOCOM 
5.7.1 Transportation to Theater $32,656 $18,132 $6,297 $19,147 $14,870  USMC 
5.10.1 Government Program Management $14,735 $1,889 $903 $3,690 $3,717  USMC 
5.10.2 
Development Contractor Program 
Management $8,665 $0 $6,385 $7,984 $11,028 SOCOM 
5.11 Training $11,750 $7,489 $7,133 $13,011 $18,587 SOCOM 
5.12 Contractor Maintenance & Support $0 $0 $0 $0 $53,903 SOCOM 
5.13 Leased Services & Equipment $332 $245 $245 $306 $423 SOCOM 
5.14 Disposal/ Demilitarization $1,098 $988 $1,092 $1,089 $959  USMC 
5.15.4 Data Manuals $1,107 $817 $816 $1,020 $1,409 SOCOM 
Table 6.  Cost per Vehicle of the Various Cost Element O&M Funded Elements for All the Services 
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C. OTHER ISSUES 
Aside from the regression analysis performed in Chapter IV, the learning curve 
analysis also concluded that the learning in the vehicles procurement for the MRAP 
program was poor. As it is not an objective of this thesis, the cause for the “flat” curves 
for the Category (CAT) I, II and III MRAP vehicles was not investigated. This is 
definitely an area for further research. 
In addition, the cost per vehicle of the government furnished equipment (GFE) for 
SOCOM was noticed to be significantly higher than the rest of the services. The apparent 
cause is that SOCOM has uncommon CONOPS requiring special or expensive 
equipment. This is another area for further research. 
D. BENEFIT AND RECOMMENDATION TO SOCOM 
In a nutshell, this study attempts to provide a statistically-supported method, using 
parametric technique of regression analysis on historical data, for SOCOM to estimate 
the cost of running their MRAP vehicles. As is often the case in cost estimating, the 
shortage of data was a problem, so one should exercise great care in using these models. 
As SOCOM is a unique service of the U.S. military, their CONOPS involving the 
MRAP vehicles is not the same as the rest of the services of the U.S. military. This means 
that the O&M cost of running these vehicles cannot be adequately answered by the 
historical data from the other services. Therefore, it is recommended that SOCOM 
embark on a program similar to the Visibility & Management of Operation & Support 
Cost (VAMOSC) management information system established by the Department Of 
Defense (DoD) so that there will be historical data available for future sustainment 
budgetary estimation of their weapon systems. 
In addition, the examination of historical data using the VAMOSC management 
information system for the Army and Marine Corps has led to the exposure of areas of 
discrepancy. It is important that corrective actions be taken to correct the errors made so 
that it does not become a major problem downstream. 
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E. PROSPECT OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is surmised by the author that the work done in this thesis revealed problems 
with the current data and as a result, produced a weak approach for the estimation of the 
O&M cost of running SOCOM MRAP vehicles for the purpose of budgetary 
sustainment. There are a few factors that implied there is a need for re-evaluation of the 
cost-estimating relationship within the next five years. Firstly, the running of the MRAP 
vehicles in the U.S. military is going to be for at least another twenty years, if not more. 
Therefore, periodic examination of the cost-estimating relationship helps to maintain the 
precision of this relationship. Secondly, the fact that O&M data from the VAMOSC 
management information system on the MRAP vehicles was not used in the analysis 
implies that re-evaluation should be carried out when the data becomes more mature. 
Thirdly, the unanswered secondary research question of how the O&M cost of the MRAP 
vehicles responds to a change in the operational tempo is another area to be looked into.  
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2007 D0023 MRAP Cougar, 
6X6 
                14 
2007 D0024 MRAP Cougar, 
4X4 
                16 
2007 D0025 MRAP JERRV, 
4X4 
                125 
2007 D0026 MRAP Buffalo                 23 
2007 D0027 MRAP JERRV, 
6X6 
                181 
2008 D0023 MRAP Cougar, 
6X6 
        $70.57 $0.00 $2.61 $0.00 8 
2008 D0025 MRAP JERRV, 
4X4 
$1,036.82 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00  $117.62 $96,863.48 $4.35 $3,582.66 1157 
2008 D0026 MRAP Buffalo $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00  $0.00 $141.14 $0.00 $5.22 16 
2008 D0027 MRAP JERRV, 
6X6 
$1,987.86 $23,285.29 $0.00 $0.00  $47.05 $6,327.41 $1.74 $234.03 461 
2009 D0024 MRAP Cougar, 
4X4 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00  $0.00 $24.59 $0.00 $0.87   
2009 D0025 MRAP JERRV, 
4X4 
$310,164.70 $303,985.21 $15,005.92 $23,285.29  $1,130.97 $150,713.41 $40.02 $5,333.10   
2009 D0027 MRAP JERRV, 
6X6 
$93,131.42 $0.00 $783.89 $0.00  $196.69 $18,931.37 $6.96 $669.90   
Table 7.  Consumable and Reparable Data from Marine Corps’ VAMOSC Management Information System 
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RG-31 CHARGER     MRAP                             2007 1 1,291.13 0.00 1,291.13 145 
RG-31 CHARGER     MRAP                             2007 2 1,323.97 0.00 1,323.97 124 
RG-31 CHARGER     MRAP                             2007 3 933.16 0.00 933.16 89 
RG-31 CHARGER     MRAP                             2007 4 1,186.26 0.00 1,186.26 81 
HAGA -1053               
MRAP 
AMBULANCE 2008 4 1,424,442.45 110,064.32 1,534,506.77 121 
MK1-2251                   MRAP BUFFALO 2008 1 19,168.19 600.06 19,768.25 9 
MK1-2251                   MRAP BUFFALO 2008 2 13,592.55 276.04 13,868.59 13 
MK1-2251                   MRAP BUFFALO 2008 3 10,747.84 515.76 11,263.60 12 
MK1-2251                   MRAP BUFFALO 2008 4 189,712.43 14,845.21 204,557.64 12 
MRAP-2717                MRAP CAIMAN 2008 4 1,018,643.43 113,276.89 1,131,920.32 298 
XM1220-0908             MRAP CAIMAN 2008 3 15,945.80 34,243.39 50,189.19 305 
XM1220-0908             MRAP CAIMAN 2008 4 1,106,509.45 109,018.69 1,215,528.13 836 
RG-31                          MRAP CHARGER 2008 1 1,099.14 360.02 1,459.16 65 
RG-31                          MRAP CHARGER 2008 2 1,319.05 472.18 1,791.23 23 
RG-31                          MRAP CHARGER 2008 3 3,042.59 493.73 3,536.32 27 
RG-31                          MRAP CHARGER 2008 4 398,504.21 220.55 398,724.76 34 
RG-31-9926                MRAP CHARGER 2008 2 3.78 1,497.79 1,501.57 12 
RG-31-9926                MRAP CHARGER 2008 3 205.19 72.93 278.12 8 
RG-31-9926                MRAP CHARGER 2008 4 12,312.22 266.16 12,578.38 20 
RG-31-9932                MRAP CHARGER 2008 1 2,966.66 1,082.73 4,049.38 17 
RG-31-9932                MRAP CHARGER 2008 2 3,253.64 671.53 3,925.16 23 
RG-31-9932                MRAP CHARGER 2008 3 8,871.95 441.63 9,313.58 24 
RG-31-9932                MRAP CHARGER 2008 4 785,184.59 8,857.43 794,042.03 40 
JERRV                        MRAP COUGAR 2008 2 132,390.41 581.51 132,971.91 4 
JERRV                        MRAP COUGAR 2008 3 3,052,742.69 38,149.07 3,090,891.76 9 
JERRV                        MRAP COUGAR 2008 4 2,757,795.21 99,401.77 2,857,196.97 16 
JERRV-2246               MRAP COUGAR 2008 1 1,009.49 360.02 1,369.51 33 
JERRV-2246               MRAP COUGAR 2008 2 82,582.77 305.97 82,888.74 66 
JERRV-2246               MRAP COUGAR 2008 3 2,527,182.55 32,160.97 2,559,343.52 76 
JERRV-2246               MRAP COUGAR 2008 4 2,419,456.02 90,849.57 2,510,305.59 68 
JERRV-5199               MRAP COUGAR 2008 3 5,240.45 67.60 5,308.05 2 
JERRV-5199               MRAP COUGAR 2008 4 481,775.88 13,800.33 495,576.21 201 
MRAP-0281                MRAP MAXXPRO 2008 3 12,958.19 675.96 13,634.15 11 
MRAP-0281                MRAP MAXXPRO 2008 4 8,810.15 3,214.29 12,024.44 282 
XM1224-4634             MRAP MAXXPRO 2008 3 201,856.41 14,314.67 216,171.08 696 
XM1224-4634             MRAP MAXXPRO 2008 4 1,582,824.78 17,983.33 1,600,808.11 1,840 
JERRV-5169               MRAP RG-31 2008 4 4,941.88 137.76 5,079.64 577 
XM1221-5581             MRAP RG-31 2008 2 58.90 0.00 58.90 53 
XM1221-5581             MRAP RG-31 2008 3 28,490.93 0.00 28,490.93 398 
XM1221-5581             MRAP RG-31 2008 4 88,555.44 153.97 88,709.41 427 
RG-33L-4677              MRAP RG-33L 2008 3 84,747.26 1,383.92 86,131.18 72 
RG-33L-4677              MRAP RG-33L 2008 4 1,933,645.98 25,949.05 1,959,595.04 566 
Table 8.  Consumable and Reparable Data from OSMIS 
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APPENDIX B. SCATTER PLOTS OF THE VAMSOC AND OSMIS 
DATA 
 
Figure 26.  Scatter Plot of the Org Consumable Cost versus Inventory (VAMOSC) 
 




Figure 28.  Scatter Plot of the Int Labor Cost versus Inventory (VAMOSC) 
 






Figure 30.  Scatter Plot of the Consumable Cost versus Density (OSMIS) 
 





Figure 32.  Scatter Plot of the Total Cost versus Density (OSMIS) 
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APPENDIX C. ANALYSIS ON MRAP JPO DATA 
 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT                 
                  
Regression Statistics               
Multiple R 0.998433669               
R Square 0.996869792               
Adjusted R Square 0.995826389               
Standard Error 5247270.881               
Observations 5               
                  
ANOVA                 
  df SS MS F Significance F       
Regression 1 2.63059E+16 2.63059E+16 955.4027953 7.43973E-05       
Residual 3 8.26016E+13 2.75339E+13           
Total 4 2.63885E+16             
                  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 4402965.415 2868532.924 1.534918905 0.222367343 -4725986.59 13531917.42 -4725986.59 13531917.42 
X Variable 1 14681.12857 474.9700093 30.90959067 7.43973E-05 13169.56202 16192.69512 13169.56202 16192.69512 







OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.997796616        
R Square 0.995598087        
Adjusted R Square 0.994130783        
Standard Error 974968.3331        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 6.44978E+14 6.44978E+14 678.5218956 0.000124115    
Residual 3 2.85169E+12 9.50563E+11      
Total 4 6.4783E+14          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 823913.4604 532987.3046 1.545840686 0.219864166 -872290.0178 2520116.939 -872290.0178 2520116.939 
Number of Vehicle 2298.820954 88.25172718 26.04845285 0.000124115 2017.964571 2579.677337 2017.964571 2579.677337 








OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.998433669        
R Square 0.996869792        
Adjusted R Square 0.995826389        
Standard Error 5247270.881        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 2.63059E+16 2.63059E+16 955.4027953 7.43973E-05    
Residual 3 8.26016E+13 2.75339E+13      
Total 4 2.63885E+16          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 4402965.415 2868532.924 1.534918905 0.222367343 -4725986.59 13531917.42 -4725986.59 13531917.42 
X Variable 1 14681.12857 474.9700093 30.90959067 7.43973E-05 13169.56202 16192.69512 13169.56202 16192.69512 







OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.995476396        
R Square 0.990973254        
Adjusted R Square 0.987964339        
Standard Error 12087492.43        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 4.81199E+16 4.81199E+16 329.3456845 0.000364977    
Residual 3 4.38322E+14 1.46107E+14      
Total 4 4.85582E+16          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 4891670.45 6607886.423 0.740277622 0.512803533 -16137573.28 25920914.18 -16137573.28 25920914.18 
Number of Vehicle 19856.14371 1094.129982 18.14788375 0.000364977 16374.13379 23338.15363 16374.13379 23338.15363 








OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.999796733        
R Square 0.999593507        
Adjusted R Square 0.999458009        
Standard Error 302909.0681        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 6.76886E+14 6.76886E+14 7377.192582 3.47874E-06    
Residual 3 2.75262E+11 91753903529      
Total 4 6.77161E+14          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 217442.9839 165591.7246 1.313127117 0.280547779 -309543.7883 744429.7561 -309543.7883 744429.7561 
Number of Vehicle 2354.99798 27.41858123 85.89058494 3.47874E-06 2267.739818 2442.256143 2267.739818 2442.256143 









OUTPUT                 
                  
Regression Statistics               
Multiple R 0.955177732               
R Square 0.912364501               
Adjusted R Square 0.883152667               
Standard Error 13021572.11               
Observations 5               
                  
ANOVA                 
  df SS MS F Significance F       
Regression 1 5.29586E+15 5.29586E+15 31.2327027 0.011314437       
Residual 3 5.08684E+14 1.69561E+14           
Total 4 5.80454E+15             
                  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 15755830.79 7118521.071 2.21335733 0.113744934 -6898480.285 38410141.87 -6898480.285 38410141.87 
X Variable 1 6587.200881 1178.680569 5.588622612 0.011314437 2836.113259 10338.2885 2836.113259 10338.2885 











OUTPUT                 
                  
Regression Statistics               
Multiple R 0.985120277               
R Square 0.97046196               
Adjusted R Square 0.960615946               
Standard Error 20061606.05               
Observations 5               
                  
ANOVA                 
  df SS MS F Significance F       
Regression 1 3.96688E+16 3.96688E+16 98.56394848 0.002173974       
Residual 3 1.2074E+15 4.02468E+14           
Total 4 4.08762E+16             
                  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 6125444.964 10967106.29 0.558528823 0.615460998 -28776781.92 41027671.85 -28776781.92 41027671.85 
X Variable 1 18028.41091 1815.927066 9.927937776 0.002173974 12249.32053 23807.50129 12249.32053 23807.50129 












OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.999210359        
R Square 0.998421341        
Adjusted R Square 0.996842683        
Standard Error 939549.7192        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1.11659E+15 5.58297E+14 632.4491878 0.001578659    
Residual 2 1.76551E+12 8.82754E+11      
Total 4 1.11836E+15          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept -10276533.19 787440.1666 -13.05055752 0.005820194 -13664614.77 -6888451.607 -13664614.77 -6888451.607 
x 22609.92535 701.3281088 32.23872687 0.000960767 19592.35405 25627.49665 19592.35405 25627.49665 
x^2 -1.50685421 0.049929588 -30.17958422 0.001096122 -1.721683888 -1.292024531 -1.721683888 -1.292024531 









OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.994291743        
R Square 0.988616071        
Adjusted R Square 0.977232142        
Standard Error 1279466.668        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2.8433E+14 1.42165E+14 86.84313311 0.011383929    
Residual 2 3.27407E+12 1.63703E+12      
Total 4 2.87605E+14          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept -1286871.058 1072325.845 -1.200074645 0.352979963 -5900716.781 3326974.665 -5900716.781 3326974.665 
x 11300.84277 955.0595571 11.83260529 0.0070667 7191.553157 15410.13238 7191.553157 15410.13238 
x^2 -0.846449853 0.067993468 -12.44898779 0.006390769 -1.139002134 -0.553897572 -1.139002134 -0.553897572 











OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.994292221        
R Square 0.988617021        
Adjusted R Square 0.984822695        
Standard Error 4923841.653        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 6.31686E+15 6.31686E+15 260.5513978 0.000517205    
Residual 3 7.27326E+13 2.42442E+13      
Total 4 6.3896E+15          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 4913111.037 2691723.415 1.825265928 0.165448917 -3653154.199 13479376.27 -3653154.199 13479376.27 
Number of Vehicle 7194.216204 445.6939939 16.14160456 0.000517205 5775.819 8612.613407 5775.819 8612.613407 










OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.997796616        
R Square 0.995598087        
Adjusted R Square 0.994130783        
Standard Error 101858.5703        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 7.03978E+12 7.03978E+12 678.5218956 0.000124115    
Residual 3 31125505011 10375168337      
Total 4 7.0709E+12          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 86077.30554 55683.16732 1.545840686 0.219864166 -91131.38453 263285.9956 -91131.38453 263285.9956 
Number of Vehicle 240.1663805 9.219986382 26.04845285 0.000124115 210.8242689 269.5084921 210.8242689 269.5084921 











OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.99977305        
R Square 0.999546152        
Adjusted R Square 0.99939487        
Standard Error 133603.5931        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 1.17937E+14 1.17937E+14 6607.148571 4.10405E-06    
Residual 3 53549760230 17849920077      
Total 4 1.17991E+14          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 90547.18615 73037.2634 1.239739579 0.303208859 -141889.9829 322984.3552 -141889.9829 322984.3552 
Number of Vehicle 983.0098689 12.09346749 81.28436855 4.10405E-06 944.523058 1021.49668 944.523058 1021.49668 









OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.997796616        
R Square 0.995598087        
Adjusted R Square 0.994130783        
Standard Error 339528.5676        
Observations 5        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 7.82198E+13 7.82198E+13 678.5218956 0.000124115    
Residual 3 3.45839E+11 1.1528E+11      
Total 4 7.85656E+13          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 286924.3518 185610.5577 1.545840686 0.219864166 -303771.2818 877619.9854 -303771.2818 877619.9854 
Number of Vehicle 800.5546017 30.73328794 26.04845285 0.000124115 702.7475631 898.3616404 702.7475631 898.3616404 
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APPENDIX D. PROCUREMENT PRICE FOR MRAP VEHICLES 
     CAT I 
Vehicle Awards To Date  Qty   Total Cost   Avg Unit Cost  
 BAE  LRIP 1 14-Feb-07 FY07  DO 2           15 $8,131,500 $542,100 
 FPII  LRIP 1 14-Feb-07 FY07  DO 2           65 $33,185,100 $510,540 
 GDLS  LRIP 2 23-Feb-07 FY07  DO 2           10 $5,295,090 $529,509 
 FPII  LRIP 3 23-Apr-07 FY07  DO 3         772 $343,008,092 $444,311 
 IMG  LRIP 4 31-May-07 FY07  DO 2      1,200 $623,073,400 $519,228 
 FPII  LRIP 5 19-Jun-07 FY07  DO 4         395 $187,466,210 $474,598 
 AH  LRIP 7 13-Jul-07 FY07  DO 2      1,154 $511,222,000 $443,000 
 IMG  LRIP 7 20-Jul-07 FY07  DO 4         755 $413,869,860 $548,172 
 GDLS  LRIP 8 7-Aug-07 FY07  DO 3         600 $335,748,600 $559,581 
 FPII  LRIP 8 10-Aug-07 FY07  DO 5           25 $12,763,500 $510,540 
 FPII  LRIP 9 18-Oct-07 FY08  DO 6         553 $245,703,983 $444,311 
 IMG  LRIP 9 18-Oct-07 FY08  DO 5      1,000 $537,241,000 $537,241 
 AH  LRIP 10 18-Dec-07 FY08  DO 3         668 $305,676,132 $457,599 
 FPII  LRIP 10 18-Dec-07 FY08  DO 7         178 $90,876,120 $510,540 
 IMG  LRIP 10 18-Dec-07 FY08  DO 6      1,500 $805,861,500 $537,241 
 AH  LRIP 11 14-Mar-08 FY08  DO 4      1,024 $481,835,008 $470,542 
 FPII  LRIP 11 14-Mar-08 FY08  DO 8           12 $6,321,792 $526,816 
 IMG  LRIP 11 14-Mar-08 FY08  DO 7         526 $291,038,460 $553,305 
 GDLS  LRIP 12a 17-Jul-08 FY08  DO 4         773 $442,841,162 $572,886 
 Avg Unit Cost/Awards to Date    11,225 $5,681,158,509 $506,117 








      CAT II  
 Vehicle Awards To Date   Qty   Total Cost   Avg Unit Cost  
 FPII SS  N/A 9-Nov-06 FY07  DO 1      100 $57,306,400 $573,064 
 FPII SS  N/A 5-Dec-06 FY07  DO 2      100 $57,306,400 $573,064 
 BAE  LRIP 1 14-Feb-07 FY07  DO 2        75 $47,235,000 $629,800 
 FPII  LRIP 1 14-Feb-07 FY07  DO 2        60 $34,221,840 $570,364 
 FPII  LRIP 3 23-Apr-07 FY07  DO 3      228 $120,867,816 $530,122 
 IMG  LRIP 5 18-Jun-07 FY07  DO 3        16 $8,492,976 $530,811 
 FPII  LRIP 5 19-Jun-07 FY07  DO 4        60 $34,221,840 $570,364 
 BAE  LRIP 6 28-Jun-07 FY07  DO 3      255 $122,349,000 $479,800 
 AH  LRIP 7 13-Jul-07 FY07  DO 2        16 $7,321,584 $457,599 
 FPII  LRIP 8 10-Aug-07 FY07  DO 5      100 $57,036,400 $570,364 
 BAE  LRIP 9 18-Oct-07 FY08  DO 5      399 $191,440,200 $479,800 
 FPII  LRIP 9 18-Oct-07 FY08  DO 6      247 $130,940,134 $530,122 
 BAE  LRIP 10 18-Dec-07 FY08  DO 6      600 $287,880,000 $479,800 
 FPII  LRIP 10 18-Dec-07 FY08  DO 7      180 $102,665,520 $570,364 
 BAE  LRIP 11 14-Mar-08 FY08  DO 7      393 $191,980,500 $488,500 
 FPII  LRIP 11 14-Mar-08 FY08  DO 8          6 $3,527,628 $587,938 
 Avg Unit Cost/Awards to Date   2,835 $1,454,793,238 $513,155 
Table 23.  Procurement Price for CAT II MRAP Vehicles (FY 2007 to 2008) 
 
      CAT III  
 Vehicle Awards To Date   Qty   Total Cost   Avg Unit Cost  
 FPII SS  N/A 9-Nov-06 FY07  DO 1    44 $30,762,116 $699,139 
 FPII SS  LRIP 4 30-May-07 FY07  DO 6    14 $9,787,946 $699,139 
 FPII SS  LRIP 11 14-Mar-08 FY08  DO 7    11 $7,690,529 $699,139 
 Avg Unit Cost/Awards to Date    69   48,240,591  $699,139 
Table 24.  Procurement Price for CAT III MRAP Vehicles (FY 2007 to 2008) 
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APPENDIX E. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT COST FOR 
MRAP VEHICLES  
USMC  
Equipment Cost Per Vehicle 
MCTAGS $9,065 
OGPK $10,788 
Drivers Vision Enhancement (DVE), A Kit (11.5K) & B Kit (11.5K ea) $23,000 
BFT Install Kit, Cables, MT2011E/F Mount $0 
BFT Keyboard Trays $286 
FBCB2/Blue Force Tracker             $16,022 
Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR) $2,131 
DAGR Spares (10%) $0 
Counter IED Jammer $88,000 
HANDCRANKS $551 
AN VRC-103 UHF SATCOM Radio $7,917 
AN VRC-104 HF Radio $3,611 
AN/VRC-104 RF cable $32 
AN/VRC-110 MBR $14,400 
MT 6352 Mounting Tray  $1,252 
SATCOM ON THE GO & AN/VRC 110 Cables $555 
TOCNET Vehicle Intercom System $35,277 
Power Distribution Unit (PDU) $1,106 
Metal work 585,000 $339 
360 degrees Spotlight $13,000 
Headsets $283 
Vehicle Medical Kit $1,351 
GyroCam $2,656 
Integration - 2nd phase $26,507 
Total $258,129 









Equipment Cost Per Vehicle 
OGPK $14,623 
DVE A Kit $10,431 





SINCGARS B Kit $2,340 






TWO ITAS $61 
Integration (100/month) $9,810 
Total $246,848 
Table 26.  Cost of GFE for Army (FY 2008) 
Navy  
Equipment Cost Per Vehicle 
MCTAGS $5,380 
OPGK $11,884 
FBCB2/Blue Force Tracker $13,902 
DAGR $2,131 
BFT Keyboard Trays $287 
Counter IED Jammer Chameleon for CAT I $64,600 
Counter IED Jammer Chameleon for CAT II $18,027 
AN VRC-103 UHF SATCOM Radio $51,163 
AN VRC-104 HF Radio $11,509 
MT-6352 $1,134 
AN VRC-110 Multi-Band Radio $35,712 
TOCNET Vehicle Intercom System $27,526 
DVE $22,472 
Lighting, PA and Siren ECP $5,000 
 TOCNET Upgrade $696 
Litters (CASEVAC)  $441 
Manual Traversuring Unit (MTU) $145 
Integration $12,250 
Total $284,258 
Table 27.  Cost of GFE for Navy (FY 2008) 
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Air Force  
Equipment Cost Per Vehicle 
AN VRC-110 $2,475 
AN VRC-111 Multiband Radio $28,390 
AN VRC-111 Installation Kit $2,505 
AN VRC-104 HF Radio w/o RT $16,700 
CREW 2.1 (IED Jammer) $84,844 
DAGR $0 
DAGR Antennae $0 
Duke (IED Jammer) $1,122 
EPLRS Radio for FBCB2 $12,076 
FBCB2/BFT $22,000 
MCTAGS $929 
Manual Traversing Unit (MTU) $57 
MRC-167 PDU w/Cables $1,300 
MT-6352 Power Tray $965 
OGPK (Turret) $14,462 
PRC-117 Installation Kit $15,030 
Thermal Imager DVE $13,026 
TOCNET $35,000 
X-Wing SATCOM Antennae $1,130 
Integration  $17,780 
Total $269,791 
 
Table 28.  Cost of GFE for Air Force (FY 2008) 
SOCOM  
Equipment Cost Per Vehicle 
MBITR (PRC-148) $14,351 
MBITR Integration $16,483 
VIC-3 $10,826 
FY07: C4I Support/Long Lead Items (SATCOM, ROVER III, BFT) & 
Components for VIC3, MBITR, ECMS and Engineering Support $42,060 
ECM System $2,682 
Gunners Protection Kit $9,147 
Kongsberg Remote Weapons Station (RWS) $356,393 
FY 08 (PROC): RWS & C4I (Hardware/Software) Upgrades $42,643 
RWS Training Devices/Instructors $27,886 
Additional Load List $22,443 
Total $544,914 
Table 29.  Cost of GFE for SOCOM (FY 2008) 
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